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For quite a long time suggestions have been
made to Croatia that it should link up with its east-
ern neighbours. These tendencies took on hard
outlines in the proposal of the USA that there
should be co-operation in south-east Europe, and
in the regional Balkan approach of the European
Union.
Although it does not formally seem so, both
proposals are from the same source, and it is
clearly a matter of an agreed-upon double-
pronged approach. The regional approach of the
European Union is individually conditioned, while
the proposals of the USA apparently does not
have this, although any analysis will show that this
is not the case.
The joint source for these approaches can
be found in the New Trans-Atlantic Programme
(NTA), which was signed by the US and the EU
in 1995. The main feature of this programme is
that in many of the things contained it "a transi-
tion was made from solemn promises to joint
programmes".
Concretely, there is a joint programme for
the "solution of all the historical, political and eth-
nic problems of the Balkan region" (J. G.
Kornblum, "A new Atlantic community", Weekly
Review, Number 25,1996), and that it is formalised
in two conceptions comes from the fact that the
US and the EU do not have the same "tool-box",
as intervention instruments are so picturesquely
referred to in the concept.
The EU, as a still primarily economic com-
munity, has economic instruments. The US does
not have direct economic instruments, but politi-
cal and security instruments can be found in their
box (the authority of the world super-power and
the NATO Partnership for Peace system), which
cannot simply be ignored.
The combination of political, economic and
security instruments can be so efficient that any
state not accepting concepts that derive from such
great powers must have valid reasons indeed for
rejecting them,
It is, then, in order to ask whether Croatia
does have such valid reasons when it does reject
them. Let it be said at once that it has reasons
with respect to both form and content. In a for-
mal sense, Croatia is a sovereign and internation-
ally recognised state that has the right to reject
various proposals that come from outside, espe-
cially those that directly or indirectly put at risk,
or might put at risk, its international status. In
terms of content, every state, including Croatia
then, will accept those forms of international col-
laboration it deems useful, and reject forms that
it deems harmful for itself.
The size of a state does not have an essen-
tial effect on international co-operation. We can
find acceptance or rejection of international co-
operation in the international area every day, es-
peciallywhere economic relations are concerned.
Both large and small states are apt to this.
The USA, for example, at the time of the
Reagan administration, proposed that a liberal
farm products trade system should be established
at a world level. Along with the proposal a sol-
emn promise was made that the US would do this
if others would too, and not later than 1999.
Although this message was directed to the
world at large, it was primarily addressed to the
European Union (for the agricultural war between
the US and the EU is constantly smouldering),
which did not consider the proposal worth con-
sidering, and it was never taken seriously.
It is clear that the Union considered that
the acceptance of this proposal would be disad-
vantageous. It may be said that this case is not
typical, that it is a matter of two economic giants
trying to force their will upon each other. And
this is indeed true. However, this also exists in the
relations between Davids and Goliaths. For ex-
ample, Norway twice refused to become a mem-
ber of the EU. The Norwegian people on two oc-
casions decided that their government had been
hasty in initialling a treaty to join the Union, and
in a referendum warned the government not to
do this.
This can happen tomorrow with some other,
less well developed member of the Union, for the
dissatisfaction of the people (especially the farm-
ers) is growing, as witnessed by various polls, and
by the very fact that the Union has had to set aside
special resources for PR.
Accordingly, there can be no hard and fast
lines according to which some state or other has
to accept something just because someone has had
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the liberty to offer it, because it is, allegedly, good
for this state. There is still the very realistic ques-
tion of what the ties are that do link various states
and nations, and whether that solution that puts
them into a single retort, in which money and
wealth are the one inviolable measure of worth,
is really the best one.
If Kornblum is to be believed, it does seem
to be the best. Of his own country, he says that its
strength inheres in the ability to create ideas and
actions in an "unpredictable way". He claims that
the strength of the US derives from the fact that
it has "absorbed people from all nations" and has
given them the ability to "think creatively" to an
enormous extent, and, as the biggest laboratory
for social change in the world, inspires the people
who identify with it. That iswhy the US, concludes
Kornblum, is "in a certain sense" the connective
tissue at a time of divisive movements in many
European societies. Kornblum, in the good Marx-
ist way, thinks that the quantity of a certain mo-
ment can be transformed into quality. If that were
really the case, the USA would not be what it is.
But there are completely different reasons for this.
New forms for a new synthesis
The quickening of the American advance
into the European space on the threshold of the
21st century has deeper springs and other inten-
tions. Now it is clear that the post-war leadership
of America is being seriously shaken. Powerful,
newly-created systems like that of the European
Union have put a spanner into smoothly running
schemes and seek the voice in many regions that
belongs to them in the nature of things.
In Europe today really nothing can happen
without the EU, or in the Pacific without Japan.
The mono angular world has become triangular,
and there is accordingly a new apportionment of
roles. This is how it is in economics, and it will be
that way tomorrow in politics.
Accordingly, when the Americans are seek-
ing new forms for new syntheses, this is an attempt
at preserving their leadership in a new way. Con-
cretely, for Europe the creation of the New Trans-
Atlantic Community is proposed, which should
have, in addition to its security (NATO) aspects,
economic and political substance as well. For the
area of the economy, this would be the establish-
ment of a free trade area (the Trans-Atlantic Free
Market), and in the area of politics, the joint re-
sponsibility of the EU for political processes in
Europe and an agreed approach to crisis areas in
Europe and the world. In the Pacific this would
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be put into practice via some future Pacific Free
Market, while Latin America is already accounted
for by NAFTA.
Changes in the American approach to glo-
bal world problems were already apparent in
Clinton's first term in office. Then, in Seattle in
1993, the heads of state or prime ministers of 18
Pacific states were presented with the American
view of international co-operation. With the Eu-
ropeans this was done at the end of 1995, when
the NTA programme was signed, while NAFTA
was gradually percolating down through Mexico
to the other regions of Latin America.
In each of these projections a key local part-
ner was sought. Within Europe, this is the EU,
and if the NTA programme is borne in mind, then
it can be stated that the approach of both the part-
ners to the concrete south east region was agreed
in principle, although there were important dif-
ferences between them.
The difference in scope is particularly vis-
ible. The American proposal takes in a greater
number of states, while the EU programme re-
lates to the states that have come into being in
what used to be Yugoslavia. The American
programme takes in certain countries that already
have a special treaty status with the EU (Hun-
gary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, which have
associate status, while Turkey has a customs
union). There is also a difference in substance.
Apparently the SECI programme is non-obliga-
tory and based on the principle of interest, while
the European Union programme is binding. Ac-
cepting it or rejecting it will affect the economic
relations of each of these states in the regional
programme with the European Union.
Regional approaches and programmes are
nothing new in the activities of the EU towards
given areas in the world. It has this kind of
programme for more or less every region in the
world. There is the Central European programme,
the Mediterranean programme, the Latin Ameri-
can programme, a programme particularly for
Russia and one for the ASEAN countries.
In fact, for its many relations with various
states, the EU has worked out a whole network
of treaties and strategies. And as far as we know,
none of them have built into them any of those
terms of reference that we find in the regional
approach. To date what has been sought has been
mainly the fulfilment of certain standard matters
in the area of human rights, freedom of the me-
dia, market freedoms, stability of the national
economy, and there was also insistence on the
adjustment of the instruments of politics and eco-
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nomics to the demands of the modern market of
the western world. There were no conditional so-
lutions according to which the EU would enter
into treaty relations with a certain state only un-
der the condition that such a state set up special
connections with some one or all of the states sur-
rounding it.
On the contrary, quite the reverse was true.
After the application of Schengen, for example,
Austria had to rescind any advantages its
neighbours might have had, because according to
Schengen the Austrian border control was actu-
ally the EU border control, and not just that of
the state of Austria. Similarly, the European
Union has not made a reconciliation between
Turkey and Greece, particularly about the Cyprus
dispute, a condition for the signing of a customs
union with Turkey. True, the customs union be-
tween Turkey and the EU was put off for a cer-
tain time, not because of Greece (a member of
the EU) but because of the Kurdish problem and
human rights.
Accordingly, everything is relative, and be-
hind both the proceedings of the EU and its re-
gional approach are obviously other intentions,
irrespective of what the leaders and spokesmen
of the EU say after the Croatian protest. This can
be seen in the interview with the Dutch ambassa-
dor in which, among other things, it is said that
the Croatia is a viral region, from which the Union
has no wish to import viruses. In other words, it
has first of all to be decontaminated, and only
when it has been cleaned up can there be any talk
of any possible co-operation.
In very undiplomatic language then, he said
what cannot be read in the documents, and as it is
hard to believe this is just an accidental mistake it
can logically be concluded that in some way it
serves and follows in the footsteps of the global
strategy.
The EU stand-point about the regional ap-
proach
The European Union stated its viewpoint
about the regional approach in a special document
called Future treaty relations with certain countries
in south-east Europe. This document was prepared
by the European Commission and accepted by the
Council of Ministers on February 28, 1996.
Because of the importance of this docu-
ment, it is worth while laying out its basic terms
of reference. Here it should first be said that it is
a collection of principles on the basis of which
future relations between the countries mentioned
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in the document can be developed, However, it
should at once be noticed that Albania and
Macedonia are separated out, although they are
mentioned in the introduction, the reason being
that these states have already established certain
relationships with the Union, as is particularly
mentioned in the document.
For all practical purposes, this document
relates to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
FR Yugoslavia. According to this document, for
the EU to set up treaty relations with these states,
the future agreements have to contain elements
of a "clear political and economic linkage, includ-
ing in particular respect for human rights, minor-
ity rights, the rights of displaced persons and refu-
gees, democratic institutions, political and eco-
nomic reforms, a readiness for there to be open
and co-operative relations between these coun-
tries, and total adherence to the provisions of the
Peace Agreement" (EU document about a "re-
gional approach").
In other words, the EU makes the follow-
ing the conditions for any form of future treaty
based collaboration:
- respect for human rights in general and the mi-
nority rights of various groups of the population
in the territory of a given state;
- respect for democratic institutions;
- respect for political and economic reforms:
- willingness for there to be open and co-opera-
tive relations among these states and
- total adherence to the provisions of the Peace
Agreement, which is in connection with the pres-
ervation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
FR Yugoslavia has an additional condition
imposed on it, the granting of a high degree of
autonomy to Kosovo.
The European Union's regional approach and
the Republic of Croatia
Croatia has long since fulfilled these condi-
tions. It respects human rights in general as well
as the minority rights of various groups of the
population. It has from this point of view passed
all the necessary laws, from the Constitution to
the special law about minorities that gives them
minority rights beyond European standards, which
was confirmed by Croatia's being accepted into
the Council of Europe. Croatia also respects the
rights of the displaced and refugees, and insists
that others do the same.
Croatia also respects democratic institu-
tions. It has a legally elected government, a con-
stitutional court that is a check on government,
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there is freedom of party activity, there are no
defined political crimes, and freedom of speech
and writing is in no way restricted. According to
the objective evaluations of foreign institutions,
Croatia is at the top of the list of states in transi-
tion with respect to economic reforms and eco-
nomic recovery.
Croatia is adhering to the Dayton (Paris)
Agreement, and is trying to make sure that it is
carried out consistently. Because of Croatian in-
sistence on the legitimacy of the Croats in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, guilt is transferred to the state
of Croatia, which is kept in a kind of captivity be-
cause of a completely false conviction that all three
states are equally responsible for war having bro-
ken out in the former Yugoslavia. It is still more
ridiculous to ignore the fact that Croatia was
dragged into awar, that it was waged on Croatian
territory, even at the time when there was no war
in Bosnia and Herzegovina at all, its leadership
providing logistic support for the aggression
against Croatia.
This is a historical fact. It cannot be rebut-
ted by claims that this was a matter of civil war.
These facts are not unknown to the Euro-
pean Union, and they were the basis for the rec-
ognition of Croatia as an independent state. It may
be asked why the Union is now willing to accept
another point of departure, and what its inten-
tions are in setting up blanket conditions for fu-
ture relations with Croatia that are so unspeci-
fied that they can every day be interpreted inwhat-
ever way is most convenient to the Union.
If the European Union really has no other
intentions, apart from that there should be stabil-
ity and good relations between the states in the
area, why then are the conditions not made more
precise, as they were by the Council of Europe,
and then it would be clear what things were all
about.
What does the stand-point of the "Euro-
pean document about a regional approach" that
any treaties that the countries of the "regional
approach" make with the EU will have to express
their individual willingness to enter into "open and
co-operative relations" actually mean? It would
mean that any treaty Croatia might conclude with
the EU would have to have built into it provisions
about Croatian openness and co-operativeness
with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, not ac-
cording to its own evaluation but according to the
European Union's way of thinking.
The problem of the regional approach lies
in the fact that it steps outside the framework of
treaty relations between states and imposes un-
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usual approaches for international communica-
tions. That iswhy the Croatian government is right
to look askance at such an approach, and not to
accept the sui generis treaty that the European
Union is offering.
Croatia is a small country that is vitally in-
terested in having good relations with other states,
especially with neighbouring countries, and that
includes Serbia, for several reasons, particularly
economic. However, Croatia cannot be interested
in relations of co-operativeness that tend towards
syntheses that recall past times.
During its 45 years as part of Socialist Yu-
goslavia, Croatia paid 102billion dollars of its own
GNP to help support the army and other federal
institutions, including economic aid to the lesswell
developed areas of the former state. For the up-
keep of the former state, more than two billion
dollars left Croatia every year.
This is a large sum of money, and if there
had been no such allocations Croatia would to-
day have been on a par economically with devel-
oped European states.
The EU regional approach document, as
can be seen, is exceptionally rigid, informed by
unacceptable and illogical points of view and ob-
viously drawn up with covert and ulterior motives.
How otherwise are we to understand the various
demands being made on Croatia that have no
political and economic logic?
In the practice of the treaty relationships
that the EU makes with third countries, it is im-
possible to find an example of the Union condi-
tioning its relations with some other state on that
state's establishing identical treaties with some
other state that the Union determines. Concretely,
in the document, the Union requires that all the
three states that are mentioned set up co-opera-
tive relations in various areas. In the matter of
trade, it is required that each state give the other
various privileges, and if they do not, the Union
will not be expected to offer them the various
kinds of relief in the treaty that it will make with
each of them separately.
This is an absolutely new departure in the
treaty relations of the EU with third states. In its
international communications practice the Union
has developed special types of treaty. They range
from the standard commercial treaty to commer-
cial treaties of the customs union and free trade
zone type. And as far as we know, there is no kind
of linkage in any of them. Poland, for example,
has the status of associated member. In this treaty
there is no mention of its having to have such and
such a relation with the Czech Republic, also an
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associated member. That these two countries have
a free trade system in their relations with each
other has nothing to do with their relations with
the Union. This is the result of another agreement,
on which the collaboration of the central Euro-
pean states rests. Accordingly, the European
Union has initiated a special regime for those
states that it treats in its regional approach, and
has begun to create a new type of treaty relation,
which will perhaps be applied to some other re-
gions as well.
And at the end, all these sui generis
endeavours of the Union peak in the insistence
on political dialogue. The terms of reference of
this political dialogue will be determined in the
form of a joint declaration. The document does
not specify everything understood by political dia-
logue. All that is underlined is that one impor-
tant element within any future agreement with any
of the states mentioned would be that negotia-
tions have to go in parallel with consideration of
the regional aspect of co-operation.
In the concrete implementation of the Re-
gional Approach Document there is no anticipa-
tion of making a single treaty with all the three
states mentioned. The European Union will make
a treaty about mutual relations with each one of
them separately, which might lead to the conclu-
sion that it does recognise the fact that it is a mat-
ter of different states. Objectively speaking, no
other form at this moment can possibly be applied.
These are now independent states, but the situa-
tion at present is not at issue, rather what is the
intention for the future.
That the European Union has something
different in mind can be gathered from the fol-
lowing fragment: "future treaty relations - be-
tween the Union and individual states - should be
established on a case by case basis, although a
certain degree of similarity among them could be
taken into consideration. The first agreements
with these countries should remain co-operation
agreements, even if in certain aspects they may
go beyond the economic contents of traditional
first generation trade and co-operation agree-
ments".
•
In other words, Croatia has stopped on the
first rung, even if in certain areas of relations with
the Union it has more fully developed forms of
co-operation. It has stopped at a trade and co-
operation treaty, everything else being unattain-
able for Croatia, as long as it does not satisfy cer-
tain defined and undefined criteria that the Union
has set up.
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For Croatia this kind of approach is abso-
lutely unacceptable. The member states of the
European Union, and accordingly the Union as a
whole, are the main trade partner. All other eco-
nomic transactions are, both ways,with the Euro-
pean Union. Economically speaking, it has always
been more integrated with this region than with
any other region in Europe, more integrated even
than with states with which it at one time lived in
a common state. If Slovenia is excluded, only two
tenths of Croatia's foreign trade waswith the other
parts of ex-Yugoslavia. And even then, this was
mainly constrained trade, for it was forced byeco-
nomic instruments to buy from this region, al-
though it could have obtained things cheaper and
better abroad. The fact is that Croatia was never
very strongly integrated in this Yugoslav space and
it is rather questionable why it is now being forced
to get more deeply integrated with this area.
From the point of the EU too it is illogical.
By forcing Croatia into this economic area it loses
a serious trade partner, not one that is crucial to
the Union, but important for some of the mem-
bers, for Croatia imports goods of various kinds
to the value of two billion dollars a year from the
Union.
The overall impression is that the Union has
put into the Regional Approach Document num-
bers of unknowns and things that can be inter-
preted in various ways. Croatian policy has a very
cautious interpretation of them and rejects every
idea that might led to some new political commu-
nity. Croatia does not want any kind of regional
approach and draws attention to the evolution-
ary provision of the document, according to which
the European Union can set up bilateral relations
with Croatia, irrespective ofthe fact that it is pres-
ently "impossible to foretell when the necessary
conditions for this might be created".
Croatian rejection of a regional approach
and discussion about trade and co-operation with
the EU in a package with some other states is the
subject of subsequent interpretations about how
this has all been wrongly understood, that there
is no question of bringing into being any new po-
litical community, and that indeed the Document
pays full attention to the specificities of each of
the said three countries, that there are simply cer-
tain criteria that obligate all three countries (State-
ment of the Council of Ministers of the EU, Lux-
embourg, October 28, 1996).
However, this statement has not been con-
firmed by practice. Ten days after the statement,
the Council of Ministers called representatives of
the states concerned in the regional approach to
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a meeting in Paris at the same time and the same
place, for the purpose of preparatory talks about
the beginning of negotiations in connection with
signing trade and co-operation treaties. The only
differences were in the timetable of the talks with
the individual delegations.
Later statements from individual officials
of the Union and statements of individual repre-
sentatives of member states made in order to tone
down the forcefulness of the Document actually
clarified nothing but only added to the confusion.
It was the Dutch Ambassador who went the
furthest in this, revealing the background to the
whole of the Document with his statements that
Croatia was still "one of the problems in the re-
gion", whence, presumably, the current approach
to Croatia. In addition, the Dutch Ambassador
permits the whole of the Document to be inter-
preted as a form of pressure on Croatia to save
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from collapse
(Jozef. W. Scheffers, "We don't want to import
your problems into Europe as viruses", Novi list,
January 24,1997).
The same stand-point is to be found in writ-
ten evaluations of some of the members of the
EU, for example Great Britain, the second report
of whose Parliamentary Committee for European
Legislation seeks a approach to Croatia "tougher"
than that adopted by the Council of Ministers.
Thus in any objective analysis we are forced
to the conclusion that the whole of the concep-
tion of the future relations with the Union has
been established so that the Union will "open its
doors" to individual states in the region to the
extent that they open their doors to each other.
Here is that linkage that is believed to be capable
of growing into something else tomorrow.
The USInitiative for co-operation in south
east Europe
A month after the publication of the EU
regional approach programme, the US came out
with a conception of a South East European Co-
operation Initiative. It was presented to represen-
tatives of 11 states invited for the purpose to
Geneva (December 5 and 6, 1996). At the end of
the meeting, the initiative was signed by nine
states, while Slovenia and Croatia had serious
objections. An invitation sent to FR Yugoslavia
was withdrawn because of political events in that
country but is certain to be renewed.
The initiative counts on the co-operation of
12 states: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bul-
garia, Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova,
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Romania, Turkey, Slovenia, Croatia and FR Yu-
goslavia. The very list of the states included in the
Initiative clearly shows the many illogicalities of
the whole conception.
Here are states that are members of the
European Union or that have associated status.
The European Union has its own conception of
different infrastructure networks, and the ques-
tion arises as to how this conception can be
brought into phase with any conception that might
perhaps be arrived at in the context of the Initia-
tive.
What interest, for example, do Slovenia and
Croatia have in developing transportation routes
towards Romania, when they are interested in a
different route entirely?
And at the end, how can the Initiative fur-
ther the interests of these countries in European
integration, when the main promoter of the idea,
the US, is not a member of any European eco-
nomic association?
There is obviously something else at stake,
something connected with the security systems of
NATO and Partnership for Peace, and the cre-
ation of a security zone around Russia, for it is
probably estimated that a danger to Europe might
arise from that area. In this context all the illogi-
calities of the whole initiative are irrelevant, for it
is important to achieve the global aim, and it is
beside the point whether any of the states cov-
ered by the initiative really have no interest in it.
However, there is another side to this, and it is
hard to believe that Russia will put up with at-
tempts to have the NATO system on its very bor-
ders.
The Initiative is constructed as a forum at
which representatives of the members will discuss
and decide about common regional economic and
ecological problems, action about which will have
to be co-ordinated to be solved at a regional level.
Things accepted will be worked out by ad
hoc working groups that would meet immediately
after the discussion. These would be meetings of
experts who would be responsible for the elabo-
ration of concrete proposals.
The Initiative is not aimed at obviating
other proposals for co-operation in south east
Europe (the concept of the EU, the Sophia Dec-
laration about good neighbourly relations, the
Central European Initiative and Black Sea Eco-
nomic Co-operation are being thought of). It will
attempt to "complement" them (a) by close co-
operation of the governments in the region; (b)
by planning at a regional level; (c) the making of
programmes and connections that are missing: (d)
JULY - DECEMBER 1997
by assistance in the creation of a regional climate
that will encourage the participation of the pri-
vate sector.
The initiative would have an executive di-
rector (the words "a person at a high level" are
used) for the implementation of decisions ac-
cepted by the members and for the facilitation of
the implementation of projects. This person would
be chosen by the CSCE at the request of the mem-
ber states of the Initiative, which is quite unprec-
edented in the practice of international relations.
We have no knowledge of the executive director
of any organisation, even of a forum, being a per-
son appointed by some other organisation, which
speaks volumes for what the Americans think
about these states. The Initiative foresees the
foundation of a Programme Committee. This
Committee will accept programmes, determine
priorities and undertake reviews. Every state can
appoint a member to the Committee. The techni-
cal matters would be done for the Initiative by
the Economic Commission of the UN for Europe,
while the HQ of the Initiative would be in Vienna,
in the Institute for Central Europe and the
Danube Region.
The Initiative also uses the term "support-
ing states". Here other states that might be in-
vited to join in consultations in the Initiative
"whenever suitable" are being thought of.
As can be observed, the tasks of the Initia-
tive are sketched in very fluidly. Nothing concrete
is said, but precisely because the concrete is
avoided the Initiative can be used to start off any-
thing at all. It is noticeable also that the movers
of the Initiative reserve for themselves the "right"
to complement other programmes. In accord with
this, they might complement the regional ap-
proach of the EU, though we are not sure that
the Union would tolerate this.
If we link the Initiative with the regional
programme of the EU, and bearing in mind that
no important financial resources back the Initia-
tive (such as the European Investment Bank), it
is very questionable how the infrastructure of the
project might come into being. The creators of
the initiative must be completely aware that there
are no funds to put the programme into practice,
and since they themselves have not released any
of their own funds, it is a question whether the
initiative has the backing of any economic sub-
stance or whether it is just politics pure and simple
that are involved.
This fact must cause both caution and ex-
amination of what is really going on. It is neces-
sary to return again to the New Trans-Atlantic
..
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Programme and its terms of reference to extend
to the whole of Europe those methods that have
been so successful in the western part of it.
This means that the Initiative is the begin-
ning of a wider conception, in which the states in
the group would arrive at economic relations via
the infrastructure projects, at free trade zones for
example, and via this at political co-operation and
various associations that are without a doubt un-
acceptable to Croatia.
It should be recalled that the European
Union grew out of the European Coal and Steel
Community, that is, from simple components it
developed into a complex system covering the
areas of economics, and social and political life.
However, those were other circumstances and
different assumptions. There are none such in the
area covered by the Initiative. Here it is a matter
of foreign bodies, that cannot come together with-
out many problems being caused. That is why the
"Croatian" government analysts are right when
they look with dubiety at the Initiative and its in-
tentions to draw Croatia away from its natural
surroundings.
Croatia truly has no economic, and still
fewer political, interests in linking up with states
and areas with which it has never had any very
close contacts. It has been for centuries within an
entirely different environment, and its dominant
interests and intentions lie in this direction.
That is why it is counter-productive to as-
sure us that the Initiative does not lead to anykind
of political associations, as has been done by the
Initiative's Co-ordinator (Dr Erhard Busek, Presi-
dent of the Institute for Central Europe and the
Danube Region). He claims that the Initiative has
no aims whatsoever except to link twelve coun-
tries in "an economic and ecological area" and to
"help to set up routes" .
On the contrary, Busek's statement shows
that the initiative has various covert intentions.
The mere statement that someone needs to have
something forced upon him because someone else
thinks it good for him is highly questionable. Sec-
ondly, economic links are not a question of good
will, because economics has a logic of its own. In
the recent past there were wonderful examples of
economic will being forced upon certain states via
well thought-up plans. Thus the states that were
once part of COMECON created an enormous
network of co-operative links and numerous in-
stitutions with the aim oflinking the COMECON
countries tightly together. However, all of thiswas
quite in vain. The moment when discipline was
relaxed slightly, all the European members of
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COMECON turned to the west and the directions
of trade changed overnight, which, along with
other things, brought about the collapse of the
whole system. And this is the best of proofs that
economic activities will not tolerate violence.
Thus the Initiative cannot expect to be suc-
cessful. It is attempting to join incompatible things
together. And is expecting the countries that are
to be joined to pay the costs of the joining, or, in
other words, to get into debt to build something
that is not in their interest. It would be quite dif-
ferent had the Americans, via their representa-
tive Richard Schifter, offered free assistance to
the tune of 50 billion dollars, the approximate
costs of the first six projects selected (raising the
efficiency of electrical distribution, removing the
bottle-necks in the traffic arteries, linking up gas
pipelines, advancing small and medium sized com-
panies, a recovery programme for the Danube
area, and the facilitation of local border traffic).
However, even then the Initiative would have to
be rejected if in its political demands it were to
link Croatia permanently with milieux foreign to
its interests.
Instead of a conclusion
The regional approach of the European
Union and the Initiative of the United States of
America are full of unknowns and descriptions in
broad outlines, and can thus at any moment turn
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off in unpredictable directions. A literally under-
stood regional approach could lead to institutional
forms of co-operation with the states of ex-Yugo-
slavia, even with the state that went to war with
Croatia, which is at the present time quite unac-
ceptable. On the other hand, the Initiative obvi-
ously aims at some kind of free trade zone for
south east Europe, one which is not quite obvi-
ously very useful. All the states of this area want
integration with the EU, some ofthem are already
in it, others are seeking this or have associate sta-
tus, while others would like to have associate sta-
tus. Accordingly, no interest has been shown for
any deepening of economic and, especially, po-
litical collaboration in this region. When the
Americans insist on this, then, they are clearly
wanting on one hand to create a counter-balance
to the EU, and on the other to gather together
states via which in this area of Europe too they
can get close up to the borders of Russia.
The statement that the Initiative is being
connived at by the EU is not at odds with this con-
clusion. The Union does not oppose the Initia-
tive at this time, although it includes some states
that are members or associate members. The Ini-
tiative makes it easier to exert pressure on poten-
tial members, which suits the Union at this mo-
ment because it is in the process of making seri-
ous re-evaluations of its own systems. Tomorrow,
however, this might not be the case. •
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